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APPENDIX 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UT_..\_H, HAL S. BENNETT, 
W. R. McENTIRE and STEW ART 
l\L HANSON, Commissioners of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah; 
and UTAH NATURAL GAS COM-




PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON RESPONDENTS' 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
STATEMENT 
This is an appeal to this Honorable Court by writ of 
certiorari from the proceedings, Findings and Report 
and Order, of the Public Service Commission of Utah in 
case No. 3504 amended, before said Commission, entitled 
"In the matter of the Application of Utah Natural Gas 
Company for a certificate of convenience and necessity." 
The petition for writ of certiorari was filed by Utah Pipe 
Line Company, a corporation, an intervener in the abOive 
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proceedings before the Public S.ervice Commission of 
Utah under and by virtue of Section 76-6-16 of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943. The writ of certiorari thus peti-
tioned for was granted by this Court. Respondents have 
now filed their motions to dismiss the petition for writ 
of certiorari and the writ of certiorari "on the grounds 
and for the reason that it affirmatively appears from 
said petition for writ of certiorari that the petitioner, 
Utah Pipe Line Company, does not have a justiciable 
interest in the subject matter of the action." Except as 
where otherwise indicated, all underscoring is supplied. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. 
POINT ONE - Title 76 Utah Code Annotated, 
1943 expressly gives petitioner, as an aggrieved 
party, a right of review in this Court. 
The subject matter of this action is, of course, the 
application of Utah Natural Gas Company to the Public 
Service Commission of Utah in case No. 3504, Amended, 
"In the matter of the Application of Utah Natural Gas 
Company for a certificate of convenience and necessity," 
and the proceedings conducted before the Commission 
thereon and the Findings and Report and the Order is-
sued therein by the c·ommission. 
Title 76 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, concerns 
public utility regulation and contains the statutes provid-
ing for and regulating proceedings such as the one con-
cerned in this appeal. Section 76-4-24 provides in sub-
stance thatthe pub~ic utilities there listed, including the 
type of public utility involved in the proceedings before 
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the Commission in this rase, shall not construct or op-
erate certain facilities 'Yithout having first obtained 
from the Commission a certificate that present or future 
public convenience and necessity does or will require such 
construction. The section further provides that the 
Commission shall have power after a hearing to issue or 
refuse the certificate in whole or in part. 
Chapter 6 of the above title concerns the procedure 
to be followed in proceedings before the Commission 
under such title. Section 76-6-10 provides that: 
" ... :\_t the time fixed for any hearing before the 
Commission or a Commissioner, or at the time 
to which the same may have been continued, the 
complainant and the corporation or person com-
plained of, and such corporations or persons as 
the Commission may allow to intervene shall be 
entitled to be heard and to introduce evidence." 
Section 76-6-15 provides for rehearing before the 
Commission after any order or decision made by the 
Commission, and allows "any party to the action or pro""" 
ceeding, or any stockholder or bondholder or other party 
pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected" to 
apply for such rehearing. The section also provides that 
such application for rehearing shall be a prerequisite to 
appeal. Section 76-6-16 provides for the exclusive method 
of judicial review applicable in proceedings before the 
Public Service Commission. This exclusive method of 
review is, of course, by petition £or writ of certiorari 
to the Supren1e Court of the State of Utah. Such section 
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provides, in part, that within thirty days after the rendi-
tion of the decision on rehearing, 
"the applicant or any party to the proceed-
ing deeming himself aggrieved by such order or 
decision rendered upon rehearing may apply to 
the S·upreme Court for a writ of certiorari for 
the purpose of having the lawfulness of the ori-
ginal order or decision, or the order or decision 
on rehearing, inquired into and determined. 
* * * * 
"The review shall not be extended further 
than to determine whether the Commission has 
regularly pursued its authority, including a deter-
mination of whether the order or decision under 
review violates any right of the petitioner under 
the Constitution of the United States or of the 
State of Utah." 
Pursuant to and in accordance with such statutes, 
the Commission has adopted its Rules of Practice and 
Pr.ocedure, of which the following are here pertinent 
and are quoted: 
6.1-"Parties to proceedings before the Com-
mission shall be applicants, complainants, peti-
tioners, defendants, respondents, interveners, or 
protestants, according to the nature of the pro-
ceeding and the relationship of the parties there-
to." 
6.8-"An Intervener is a party who has been 
permitted to become a party to any proceeding 
before the Commission." 
6.10-"N o person will be allowed to intervene 
in any proceeding unless it shall be made to ap-
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pear to the Con1mission that he has a direct in-
terest therein." 
19.6-"'Vithin thirty days after the rendition 
of the derision on rehearing, any party to the pro-
ceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such order 
or decision, may apply to the Supreme Court for a 
\vrit of certiorari for the purpose of having the 
lawfulness of the original order or decision or the 
order or decision of the rehearing inquired into 
and determined." 
In accordance with the above quoted rules, and pur-
suant to the authority granted to it by s.ection 76-6-10, 
the Commission found that the petitioner, Utah Pipe 
Line Company, had sufficient interest and was allowed 
to intervene and thereby "became a party to the proceed-
ing.'' Rule 6.8 abo;ve quoted. 
The Commission allowed not only your petitioner, 
Utah Pipe Line Company, to intervene and become a 
party, but also allowed others such as the Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company, the Ut~h Home Builders Association, 
several railroad companies, the Utah Coal Operators 
Association and the United Mine Workers of America, 
District 22, to intervene as parties. Such interveners 
participated in the hearing as parties and cross examined 
witnesses and offered evidence insofar as the Commission 
allowed. 
As heretofore pointed out, Section 76-6-16 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, allows "the applicant or any 
party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by 
such order or decision" to apply to the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari. The test under the applicable 
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petitioning for review have a justiciable interest in the 
subject matter" as indicated by respondents' motions to 
dismiss, but is, "Is the person petitioning for review 
a party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved." 
It is submitted that any of the above interveners, as 
parties to such proceeding, had the right under the above 
quoted statutes of this state, if he deemed himself ag-
grieved, to follow the same procedure that has been fol-
lowed by one of those parties, namely, Utah Pipe Line 
Company, your petitioner herein. It is respectfully sub-
mitted, therefore, that respondents' motions to dismiss 
are not well taken. 
A statute which is very similar to the Utah statute 
and which deals with appeal from Federal Power Com-
mission rulings is the applicable section of the Natural 
Gas Act of the United States, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 717 r (b) 
which reads in part as follows: 
"Any party to a proceeding under this chap-
ter aggrieved by an order issued by the c·ommis-
sion in such proceeding may obtain a r~view of 
such order in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 
United States .... " 
The right of parties to appeal under this section 
apparently has not been raised in very many cases. In 
the case of Cia. Mexicana De Gas v. F. P. C. (CCA 5th 
1948), 167 F. 2d 804, interveners sought review of the 
action of the F·ederal Power Commission in granting to 
Reynosa Pipe Line Co. a permit and a certificate of con-
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ven1ence and necessity to export gas from Texas to 
Reynosa, Mexico. The interveners were Mexicana, a 
pipeline co1npany already serving R.eynosa with Texas 
gas, and the Railroad Comn1ission of Texas, the state 
conservation agency \Yhich intervened to prevent the ex-
portation of Texas gas and to preserve it for domestic 
use. Reynosa n1oved to dismiss, urging that petitioners 
were not aggrieved persons under the Natural Gas Act. 
The Court said, at page 805 : 
··we make short work of Reynosa's motion to 
dismiss. We think that petitioners are aggrieved 
parties 'vi thin the meaning of the act, and, as such, 
are rightfully here." 
A note in 49 Columbia Law Review 759-795, (1949) en-
titled "Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administra-
tive Action" undertakes a thorough-going analysis of the 
nature of the right which entitles a person to appeal to 
the courts for review o.f administrative orders. This 
article re-examines the leading cases bearing on this 
problem to show the confusion and complete irration-
ality which has resulted from an attempt to transfer into 
the specialized field of administrative law theories de- · 
veloped to suit general legal requirements. It is demon-
strated that the theory of case or controversy and the 
theory damnum absque injuria have been greatly dis-
torted and have lost their original validity by application 
to the problem of challenge to an administrative determi-
nation. After an examination of the various federal stat-
utes providing for review of administrative orders and 
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the leading cases in respect to these statutes, the writer 
formulates some tests: 
"Sound development of the law of standing 
requires a stripping away of the highly conceptual 
and needlessly complex refinements concerning 
'interest,' 'rights,' and private representation of 
the public interest. Every issue of standing, unless 
the statute raises unusual issues, involves the 
basically simple problem of whether or not the 
petitioner's asserted interest is in the circum-
stances deserving of legal protection. That prob-
lem may be and should be discussed without any 
attendant complexity of doctrine. Some of the 
principal elements of that problem are: (page 791-
2) 
* * * * 
"2. The constitutional requirement of case 
or controversy is satisfied when substantial in-
terests of parties on each side have in fact col-
lided-when the party seeking to challenge or to 
enforce administrative action has a substantial 
interest at stake. Despite the formulation of the 
doctrine of damnum absque injuria as requiring a 
'legal right,' a legislative intent, whether express 
or implied or read into the statute by the courts, 
is often enough to provide standing to challenge 
or to enforce administrative action. The explana-
tion of this may be either that the statute relaxes 
the requirement of a 'right' and makes an 'in-
terest' enough, or the explanation may be that 
the statute creates a 'right' to judicial review; 
nothing of substance hinges on the choice of 
phraseology." 
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Further, \Yith reference to the effect of a statute 
providing for a revie,v-, this writer said: 
''.A .. case or controversy which is otherwise 
lacking cannot be created by statute; Congress 
tried that "Tithout success in the Muskrat case. 
Nevertheless, a statute may create new interests 
or rights, thereby giving standing to one other-
\vise barred either by lack of case or controversy 
or by damnmn absque injuria. And a statute con-
ferring standing may affect the detemination of 
whether or not a right or a case or controversy 
exists. (page 7 64) 
"The effect of such a statutory provision may 
be illustrated by comparing Oklahoma v. Civil 
Service Commission with Massachusetts v. Mellon. 
In the Oklahoma case, the Civil Service Commis-
sion entered an order finding a violation of the 
Hatch Act by a member of the state highway com-
mission; this finding foreshadowed a further 
order reducing federal highway grants to Okla-
homa, unless the State removed the offending 
commissioner from office. Oklahoma instituted 
proceedings for review pursuant to a provision 
allowing review by 'any party aggrieved.' Under 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Court might have 
said that Oklahoma was not compelled to take 
any federal funds, that acceptance of funds rested 
on consent, and that Oklahoma had no standing 
to question the validity of federal grants. Instead, 
the Court held that the federal statute created a 
'legal right' in Oklahoma, and that 'By providing 
for judicial review of the orders of the Civil 
Service Commission, Congress made Oklahoma's 
right to receive funds a matter of judicial cog-
nizance. Oklahoma's right became legally enforce-
able.' The Court distinguished Massachusetts v. 
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Mellon, the Lukens Steel case, and the Alabama 
Power case by emphasizing 'the authority for 
statutory review and . . . the existence of the 
legally enforceable right to receive allocated 
grants without unlawful deductions.' " 
The Massachusetts v. Mellon, Lukens Steel and 
Alabama Power cases referred to above are the founda-
tion decisions of the damnum absque injuria theory which 
denied petitioners in these cases the right to judicial 
review. In the Oklahoma case, (Oklahoma v. Civil Serv-
ice Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 91 L. ed. 794 [1947] ), how-
ever, Congress had provided that " (c) any party ag-
grieved by any . . . order of the Commission ... " may 
have the order reviewed by filing a petition with the 
federal court. This statute, said the U. S. Supreme Court 
was sufficient: 
"Issues presented by this suit, even though 
raised by a state, are closely akin to private 
wrongs. ~ .. Congress has power to fix conditions 
for review of administrative orders. By providing 
for judicial review of orders of the Civil Service 
Commission, Congress made Oklahoma's right to 
receive funds a matter of judicial cognizance." 
(Pages 803-91 L. ed.) 
In the Rhode Island case of Public Utilities Commis-
sion v. PrDvidence Gas Co., 104 Ati.· 609, there was in-
volved a rate order by the Public Service Commission 
of that state fixing rates for gas service in certain coin-
munities. In such proceedings the cities and towns af-
fected were allowed to and did intervene, contesting the 
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fixing of rates. There \Yas an appeal by the city and to,vn 
and the above cited opinion involved a -motion of the gas 
company to disn1iss the appeal. The court held that 'vhere 
the gas company, under Public La\YS 1912, chapter 795, 
applied to the Public Service Commission to fix rates, 
the city and to,vn affected thereby, having intervened 
under Rule 3 of the Com1nission as authorized by Section 
17 of such ..._let, had the right to appeal notwithstanding 
Section 3-± of the Act limits appeal to a "complainant." 
The sections and rule referred to read as follows : 
Section 34---"Any public utility or any complain-
ant aggrieved by any order of the Commis-
sion fixing any rate, toll, charge, joint rate 
or rates ... may appeal to the Supreme Court 
for a reversal of such order." 
Section 17-"All hearings, investigations and in-
quiries before the Commission shall be gov-
erned by rules to be adopted and prescribed 
by the Commission .... " 
Rule 3-"Parties or utilities not parties, may peti-
tion in any proceeding for leave to intervene 
and be heard therein. Such petition shall set 
forth the petitioner's interest in the proceed-
ing. The leave granted on such application 
shall entitle the intervener to appear and be 
treated as a party to the proceeding." 
In makings its holding, the Court said, at page 610: 
" ... In the circumstance of the matter we are 
of the opinion that, when said city and town were 
permitted to intervene as parties in the proceed-
ing, which under the statute was being conducted 
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as t4ough it was a complaint filed with the Com-
mission, they intervened as parties complainant, 
with the rights of complainants, including the 
right of appeal from the final order afterwards 
made by the Commission." 
Another Rhode Island case is Attleboro Steam & 
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 129 Atl. 495. 
The case there involved was a proceeding to fix electric 
rates of N arragonsett Electric Lighting Co. The Attle-
boro Company was a user of Narragonsett electricity 
and intervened. Attleboro was here appealing from the 
Commission's order. The c·ourt said at page 497: 
"The Attleboro Co. is properly here by ap-
peal. Sec. 34, c. 795, provides that any public 
utility or any complainant aggrieved by any order 
of the Commission fixing any rate, etc., may ap-
peal to the Supreme Court for a reversal of such 
order. The Attleboro Co. is not a 'public utility' 
as that term is used in the Act ( 32) nor is it 
strictly a 'complainant' in the technical sense, as 
the original proceeding was begun by the Commis-
sion on its own motion (sec. 26). The Commission 
by sec. 28 is required to give notice to such inter-
ested parties as the Commission shall deem neces-
sary as provided in section 20. This latter sec-
tion requires the Commission to give to 'the public 
utility' and 'complainant,' if any, 10 days' notice 
of the time and place of the hearings. Sec. 28 
provides that, after notice is given, the proceed-
ings shall be conducted in like manner as if com-
plaint had been filed with the Commission rela-
tive to the matter investigated. Sec. 58 provides 
that the provisions of the Act shall be interpreted 
and construed liberally in order to accomplish the 
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purposes thereof. One evident purpose of the 
statute is to subject any order of the Commission 
'Yhereby anyone is legally aggrieved to review 
by the Supreme Court. The Attleboro Co. after 
appearing at the hearing in response to the notice 
and thereafter taking part in the proceedings, 
thereby became a complainant "\Yithin the meaning 
of the statute, and "ras Yested 'vith all the rights 
of a complainant, including, of course, the right of 
appeal. See P. lT. Comn1. v. Prov. Gas Co. 42 R.I. 
1, 10± ... :~. 609." 
Another authority dealing 'vith statutory provisions 
similar to the l~tah statutes is the case of Lang v. Rail-
road Connnission of California (Sup. Ct. California, 
1935) 42 P. 2d 639. In that case the Supreme Court of 
California had before it an appeal by certain truck tank 
carriers of petroleum, who had intervened in a hearing 
before the Railroad Commission of California, which 
hearing was to inquire into the reasonableness of rate 
tariffs which had been filed by rail tank carriers of petro-
leum. The railroads ·were cutting their prices for petro-
leum, attempting to regain some of the business lost to 
truck carriers. The Commission was inquiring in~o this 
reduction to see whether or not other traffic was being 
burdened by such cut, and the truck operators inter-
vened to contest the cut. From an order which, in effect, 
approved such reductions, the interveners appealed to 
the S-upreme Court. 
The sections of the statutes involved and referred to 
in the opinion are here quoted to show the remarkable 
resemblance to the Utah statutes: 
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Sec. 61 (a)-"At the time fixed for any hearing 
before the commission or a commissioner, or 
the time to which the same may have been 
continued, the complainant and the corpora-
tion or persons complained of, and such cor-
poration or persons as the commission may 
allow to intervene, should be entitled to be 
heard and to introduce evidence .... " 
Sec. 66-"After any order or decision has been 
made by the commission, any party to the 
action or proceeding, or any stockholder or 
bondholder or other party pecuniarily inter-
ested in the public utility affected, may apply 
for a rehearing in respect to any matters de-
termined in said action or proceeding and 
specified in the application for rehearing. 
" 
Sec. 67-"Within thirty days after the application 
for a rehearing is denied, or, if the applica-
tion is granted, then within 30 days after the 
rendition of the decision on rehearing, the 
applicant may apply to the Supreme Court 
of this State for a writ of certiorari or re-
view ... for the purpose of having the law-
fulness of the original order or decision or the 
order or decision on rehearing inquired into 
and determined .... " 
On appeal, the railroads contended that the peti-
tioners were mere interveners in the matter of the sus-
pension of said rates, and as such had no right to main-
tain that appeal. In answer to such contention, the Court 
stated, at page 641: 
"We do not so understand the position of the 
petitioners. While the commission, upon its 
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o'vn initiative, suspended the operation of said 
rates, the record sho\\ys that thereafter the peti-
tioners, and other tank truck carriers, protested 
the rates as filed by the rail carriers, and the 
matter 'Yas thereafter heard upon the protest of 
the tank truck carriers as well as upon the volun-
tary action of the commission in temporarily 
suspending said rates. But even as mere inter-
veners, they are made parties to the controversy, 
(section 61, subd. (a), Public Utilities Act, St. 
1915, pp. 115, 158, Act 6386, Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1931), and, as such, could petition for a rehear-
ing (section 66, Public Utilities Act, St. 1915, pp. 
115, 160, Act 6386, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1931), 
and upon its denial could apply to this court for 
a writ of review for the purpose of determining 
the lawfulness of said order (section 67, Public 
l ... tilities Act, St. 1915, p. 161, as amended by St. 
1933, p. 1157, Act 6386, Deering's Gen. Laws Supp. 
1933) ." 
An interesting case illustrating the type of interests 
allowed to appeal under the Natural Gas Act is Kentucky 
Natural Gas Corp. v. Federal Power Commission (CCA 
6th 1947), 159 F. 2d 215. In that case Kentucky was ap-
pealing from an order granting a certificate of conveni-
ence and necessity to Central Illinois Public Service Co. 
and denying it to Kentucky. Both had applied for a cer-
tificate for a twenty mile line which would come into 
the area already being served by Central Illinois. Both 
would have procured their gas from the same pipeline 
company, Panhandle Eastern. At the time of the appli-
cation Central Illinois purchased from Kentucky the 
gas it delivered to the area to which the new twenty mile 
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line would be constructed, and this new line was a lateral 
line which would relieve Central Illinois from having 
to duplicate its line from Kentucky's delivery point. 
FTom the facts in the case, it does not appear that the 
two companies were in any wa;Y competitors. They were 
only competitors in the sense that they were competing 
for a certificate for a new pipe line to serve one market. 
Kentucky appealed without any question of its right to 
do so. 
Another Federal statute with wording similar to 
the part of section 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
dealing with appeal, is the section of the Federal Com-
munications Act dealing with appeals from actions of 
the Federal Communications Commission, namely, 47 
U.S.C.A. sec. 402 (b) which reads in part: 
"(b) An appeal may be taken, in the manner 
hereinafter provided, from decisions of the Com-
mission to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in any of the follow-
Ing cases: 
"(1) By any applicant for a construc-
tion permit for a radio station, or for a radio 
station license, or for renewal of an existing 
radio station license, or for modification of 
an existing radio station license, whose appli-
cation is refused by the Commission. 
"(2) By any other person aggrieved or 
whose interests are adversely affected by any 
decision of the Commission granting or re-
fusing any such application." 
The above quoted subsection (2) is, of course, dif-
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ferent fron1 the 'Yording in the lT tah proYision (sec. 76-
6-16, supra) both in granunatical construction and in 
that it includes "any other person" rather than limiting 
the section to a party to the proceeding. The following 
cases construing such section are helpful, ho\vever, in 
demonstrating ":rhat has been considered an "aggrieved 
person." 
In the case of }~ ankee Network v. Federal Comn~?Jni­
cations Commission (C.A.D.C. 1939), 107 F. 2d 212, Yan-
kee N et,vork, the owner of existing stations in the Bos-
ton area, was appealing from an order granting the appli-
cation of The Northern Corporation to construct another 
station in that area. Yankee was appealing on the ground 
that the granting of ano"ther permit adversely affected 
their economic interest in their present stations. The 
right of Yankee to appeal under section 402 (b) (2), 
sttpra, was vigorously attacked by the Commission on 
the ground that the act did not contemplate an appeal 
from the granting of an application where the appeal 
was brought by an existing licensee claiming to be eco-
nomically affected. The Court held that Yankee did 
have the right to appeal under section 402 (b) (2), supra, 
on the grounds that its economic interests were adversely 
affected and rejected the Commission's contention that 
Yankee must show an appealable interest which is pro-
tectible as a legal interest in a Court under Common 
Law principles. 
In the case of Ward v. Federal Communications 
Oomm. (C.A.D.C. 1939), 108 F. 2d 486, the same c·ourt 
held, at page 487, that a station owner in Memphis, 
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Tennessee was an aggrieved person under the above 
quoted section and could appeal from the granting of an 
application to operate a station in Boston on the same 
frequency as the Memphis station on the grounds that the 
Boston station would create objectionable electrical in-
terference with his Memphis station. 
In reference to a situation where there are two ap-
plications for certificates for the same privilege or right, 
this same opinion reads as follows, at page 490: 
"We have said that if the Commission's prior 
consideration of a previously filed and co-pending 
application-where request has been made for 
joint consideration-has 'seriously prejudiced' an 
applicant we would have a case in which we might 
say that the latter applicant has an appealable 
interest as a person aggrieved .... " 
This honorable Court has at least once indicated 
what is considered the essential element involved in mak-
ing a party aggrieved. In the case of Openshaw v. Open-
shaw (Sup. Ct. Utah 1943) 144 P. 2d 528, the plaintiff 
filed suit to seek alimony upon a divorce decree, and 
from an insufficient judgment, she appealed. Defendant 
moved to dismiss the appeal of plaintiff on the ground 
that she was not an aggrieved party and was not pre-
judiced because she actually got a judgment for a sub-
stantial part of what she claimed. The Court dismissed 
the motion, saying, at page 530 : 
"104-41-4, U.C.A. 1943, provides that 'any 
party to a judgment or decree may appeal there-
from.' Neither the constitution nor the statute 
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lin1its the right of appeal to the party or parties 
against 'vhom a judgment or decree is rendered . 
... :\ssuming the correctness of respondent's conten-
tion to the effect that a party must be 'aggrieved' 
before he can appeal, nevertheless, if he fails to re-
cover in substance "That he claims he was entitled 
to receive, he is aggrieved." 
On the basis of the foregoing, it would definitely ap-
pear that, for an appeal to be made to this honorable 
Court from a final order of the Public Service Commis-
sion of L"tah, the law of Utah requires only that the 
party seeking the review be a "party to the proceeding 
deeming himself aggrieved" and that there is no require-
ment such as respondents urge by their motions to dis-
miss. This is more than adequately confirmed by the 
foregoing authorities and by the accepted standards. 
Petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, has, by its Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari filed with this Court, estab-
lished that it is a party "deeming itself aggrieved." It 
is respectfully submitted, therefore, that Respondents' 
Motions to Dismiss should be overruled. 
POINT TWO-Independent of the right of re-
view provided by the Utah statute, petitioner 
has such special interest in the subject matter of 
the action as to warrant review by this Court. 
Let us assume, for the purposes of argument, that, 
In spite of the clear wording in Section 76-6-16, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, to the effect that "any party to the 
proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such order 
or decision ... may apply to the supreme court for a writ 
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of certiorari" and that "the prov1s1ons of the code of 
civil procedure relating to writs of review shall so far 
as applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of 
this chapter apply to proceedings instituted in the su-
preme court under the provisions of this section," 
nevertheless the wording of Section 104-67-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, is construed to require some "beneficial 
interest." The wording of that section, dealing in gene-
ral with applications to this Court for writs of certiorari, 
reads in part: "The application must be made, on affi-
davit, by the party beneficially interested .... '' If such 
wording is interpreted as requiring some special interest 
in the subject matter of the litigation, it is submitted 
that petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, has that in-
terest. 
In the case of McCarthy v. Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah (Sup. Ct. of Utah, 1938) 77 P. 2d 331, this 
honorable Court had before it an appeal by writ of certi-
orari instituted under what is now Section 104-67-3 of 
the Utah Code Annotated, 1943. Action was on certiorari 
to review and annul an order of the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah, granting to the defendants a permit 
to operate as a contract motor carrier of property over 
the public highways of the state. The plaintiffs were com-
mon carriers of property and passen_gers over private 
lines of railroads or the public highways of the state, 
operating under certificates of convenience and necessity. 
After the issuance of the permit complained of to the 
defendants, the plaintiffs, desiring to oppose the same, 
filed with the Commission their petitions for a rehearing 
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and reconsideration of the aetion so taken, praying- that 
the pern1it be vacated or denied. The Commission denied 
the plaintiffs' petitions, and under the section hereto--
fore referred to, the plaintiffs sought revie"~ in this Court 
by writ of certiorari. It "~as contended by defendants 
that plaintiffs had no special, direct or immediate in-
terest in the proceeding or decision complained of, and 
were not injured thereby since they still might seek and 
obtain all the transportation business they could get, the 
same after as before the decision. Concerning this con-
tention, this court said, at page 335 : 
""T e cannot assent to this view. The plaintiffs 
have a special interest in opposing the defendant 
Company's application for a permit in excess of 
and different from the interest of the community 
in general. In quality, plaintiffs' interest in op-
posing the application is exactly the same as that 
of the Company in maintaining it, namely, the 
effect thereof upon their prospect for earning 
money in their business. The available supply of 
business over a given route or over all routes cov-
ered by their common facilities is the source from 
which the earnings of each carrier must come. 
Whatever subtracts from the total volume of busi-
ness is a diminution of earning capacity for those 
who must compete for and share in the remainder 
and who have equipped themselves at large ex-
pense for carrying a larger share of the business. 
True, no carrier has a property interest in any 
specific business or shipment until he actually 
gets it, connects with it, appropriates it, by con-
tracting therefor with the shipper. But he is en-
titled to his chance as a competitor at all the busi-
ness there is as against anyone proceeding unlaw-
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fully or without due authorization of the statute 
to divert or appropriate any part of it." 
In the case now before this Court, Utah Pipe Line 
Company and Utah Natural Gas Company were, at the 
time of the hearing, and are until this appeal is disposed 
of, competitors for the right to construct a pipe line 
along virtually the same route, and to serve the identical 
principal market. The success of Utah Pipe Line Com-
pany's application before the F'ederal Power Co1nmission, 
of its application before the Public Service Commission 
of Utah, and of the proposed construction of its pipe 
line, depend upon its success in contesting the applica-
tion of Utah Natural Gas Company; for it cannot, practi-
cally speaking, proceed if the certificate of Utah Natural 
Gas Company is allowed to stand, and it is here, in good 
faith, attacking the granting of such certificate to its 
competitor on the many grounds set out in its petition. 
A case similar to that before this Court is Western 
Pacific California Company v. Southern Pacific Com-
pany, 284 U.S. 47-52, 76 L. ed. 160 where petitioner, 
a railroad corporation, proposed to construct a 25-mile 
railroad along the shore of S.an Fl'ancisco Bay. Western 
Pacific made application to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission for authority to construct the road, and 
the Southern Pacific Company appeared in opposition. 
Before the application was heard by the Commission, 
Southern Pacific Company began extending its tracks 
into the same area that Western Pacific proposed to 
serve, whereupon Western Pacific brought this suit to 
enjoin such extension. The trial court entered a decree 
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granting a per1nanent injunction. On appeal the 9th 
Circuit ( 46 Federal 2d 7:29) reversed, holding that WPst-
ern Pacific 'vas not a ·~party in interest," the circuit court 
saYJ.ng: 
~· ... \s appears from the foregoing statement, 
the appellee has been organized as a corporation, 
has projected a line of railroad, and has applied 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a 
certificate of necessity. On these facts, without 
1nore, without a railroad, without a right of way, 
and 'vithout traffic to protect, it sought a perman-
ent injunction enjoining the appellant from build-
ing a spur track, or extending its line, as the case 
may be. Such showing will not, in our opinion, 
support or justify an injunction such as was 
granted here." 
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court the decision 
of the Circuit Court was reversed, the Supreme Court 
saymg: 
"If, as the court below seems to have assumed, 
a 'party in interest' must possess some clear legal 
right for which it might ask protection under the 
rules commonly accepted by courts of equity, the 
paragraphs under consideration would not mate-
rially aid the Congressional plan for promoting 
transportation. On the other hand, there was no 
purpose to permit any individual so inclined to 
institute such a proceeding. The complainant must 
possess something more than a common concern 
for obedience to law. See Massachusetts v. Mel-
lon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 67 L. ed. 1078, 1085, 43 S. 
Ct. 597. It will suffice, we think if the bill dis-
closes that some definite legal right possessed 
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by complainant is seriously threatened or that 
the unauthorized and therefore unlawful action of 
the defendant carrier may directly and adversely 
affect the complainant's welfare by bringing abo~t 
some material change in the transportation situ-
ation. Here, the petitioner was peculiarly con-
cerned; its own welfare was seriously threatened. 
It alleged the beginning of an unlawful under-
taking by a carrier which might prove deleterious 
to it as well as to the public interest in securing 
and maintaining proper railroad service without 
undue loss. It relied upon the procedure pres-
cribed by the statute to secure an orderly hearing 
and proper determination of the matter. The dis-
closures of the bill were enough to show that the 
respondent's intended action might directly and 
seriously affect the project which complainant 
was undertaking in good faith. There was enough 
to give the latter the standing of a 'party in in-
terest' within intendment of the Act." (76 L. ed. 
at page 162) 
A California case dealing with the requirement of 
beneficial interest in its statute is Bodinson Manufactur-
ing Company v. California Employment Commission 
(Sup. Ct. of California, 1941), 109 P. 2d 935. In that case 
the petitioner before the Supreme Court sought a writ 
of mandamus to compel the employment commission to 
set aside its decision awarding unemployment compen-
sation to two persons, to compel it to deny such com-
pensation to other persons, and to compel it to correct 
petitioner's merit rating under the Unemployment In-
surance Act. The petitioner was an employer who had, 
at one time, employed the persons, compensation for 
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ion, that the \Yrit of mandan1us in California was the 
proper method of appealing from alleged illegal ad-
ministrative actions. The respondents contended that 
the employer \Yas not a proper party to ehallenge the de-
cision of the Con1n1ission awarding benefits under the 
Act. In rejecting this contention, the court stated, at 
page 941: 
""In providing for manda1nus proceedings the 
Code of Civil Procedure, section 1086, requires 
only that the petitioner be a party 'beneficially 
interested.' The act provides in section 67, St. 
1939, p. 3010, that 'any employer whose reserve 
account may be affected by the payment of bene-
fits to any individual formerly in his employ may 
become an interested party to any proceeding 
under this article .... ' It is conceded that the peti-
tioner took the required steps to become an inter-
ested party under the statute in the present case 
and, indeed, was the moving party in appealing to 
the full Commission from the decision awarding 
benefits to the correspondents. We are aware of 
no authority which holds that a person permitted 
by statute to participate as an interested party 
in the administrative hearings and to take ap-
peals at the administrative level is, nevertheless, 
without a sufficient interest in the result to test 
the legality of the final decision before a court 
of law. Indeed, it seems to us that elemental prin-
ciples of justice require that parties to the ad-
ministrative proceeding be permitted to retain 
their status as such throughout the final judicial 
review by a court of law, for the fundamental is-
sues in litigation remain essentially the same." 
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Further, in addition to the foregoing, it is submitted 
that petitioner can and has shown that it is vitally in-
terested in this proceeding, and has whatever interest 
is necessary to prosecute this appeal. On December 11, 
1950 at the commencement of the hearing complained 
of before the Commission, petitioner Utah Pipe Line 
c·ompany, as set out in its petition for writ of certiorari, 
presented its petition to the Commission for leave to in-
tervene in the proceedings then about to begin, in which 
petition the Utah Pipe Line Company represented that 
there was then pending before the Federal Power Com-
mission its application for a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity for the construction and operation 
of a natural gas pipe line from Northwestern New Mexico 
to the Salt Lake City, Utah, market, and that the lTtah 
Pipe Line Co1npany felt that the Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany, which was then seeking a certificate of convenience 
and necessity from the Public Service Commission of Utah 
to build a pipe line from Southeastern Utah to the Salt 
Lake City market, was not capable of supplying the 
service but that Utah Pipe Line Company was capable 
of supplying it, and that the two parties were potential 
competitors, and that the public interest involved in the 
awarding of a certificate of convenience and necessity 
required that the qualifications of both parties be fully 
investigated. The Commission granted petitioner Utah 
Pipe Line Company the right to intervene, but restricted 
its intervention to show only why the Utah Natural Gas 
Company's application should not be granted. 
This very restriction of intervention is one of the 
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.. points upon 'vhich petitioner, lTtah Pipe Line Co1npany 
now seeks revie,Y. The petitioner has assailed such rul-
ing and restriction by the Con11uission as an action vv hich, 
is arbitrary and capricious and in Yiolation of the due 
process clause of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the l~nited States. Petitioner has followed the sole and 
exclusive statutory method of appeal from rulings and 
orders of the Public Service Commission of the State 
of Utah, and if this appeal, by the sole and exclusive 
method of writ of certiorari, is not allowed, petitioner 
has no other recourse to secure review of the wrongs 
complained of in such ruling. Certainly, then, petitioner 
has a substantial interest in appealing this proceeding, 
and it is submitted that this point alone sufficiently re-
futes respondents' statement in their motions that, "It 
affirmatively appears from said petition for writ of cer-
tiorari that the petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, does 
not have a justiciable interest in the subject matter of 
the action." 
Further in connection with petitioner's intervention, 
petitioner states that its purpose in attempting the inter-
vention above referred to was not only to contest the 
application of the Utah Natural Gas Company, but also 
to show that it, Utah Pipe Line Company, could better 
serve the interest of the public, which the Utah Pipe 
Line Company knew at the time of its intervention should 
be considered by the Public Service Commission under 
the statute requiring that certificates for construction 
of this sort would be granted only upon a showing that 
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the public interest would be protected by requiring that 
the present or future public convenience and necessity 
does or will require such construction. (76-4-24, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943; Mulcahy v. Public Service Com-
mission, (Sup. Ct. Utah 1941) 117 P. 2d 298). 
The purpose, then, of Utah Pipe Line Company was 
dual: first, to attempt to show the Commission that it, 
not Utah Natural Gas Company, could better serve the 
interest of the public; but failing in this, second, to make 
certain that the proceedings whereby Utah Natural 
Gas Company was granted a certificate would be con-
ducted in the lawful manner required by the statute. 
(76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943). As a party to 
such proceedings, Utah Pipe Line Company now prose-
cutes this appeal and complains that the Commission has 
not regularly pursued its authority as required by the 
same section above quoted, and that, in addition, the 
proceedings and the order growing out of such proceed-
ings violate rights of the Utah Pipe Line Company under 
the Constitution of the United States and of the State of 
Utah, all as set out in petitioner's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
The effect on the right to review of beirig a party 
to the ,proceeding before the c·ommission is discussed 
in Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company v. United 
States, (commonly called the Chicago Junction Case) 68 
L. ed. U. S. 667 where Mr. Justice Brandeis said: 
"The plaintiffs may challenge the order be-
cause they are parties to it. The Judicial Code, 
Sec. 212 (originally the Commerce Court Act, 
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June 1S, 1910, chap. 309, 36 Stat. nt L. 5-!~, Con1p. 
Stat. See. 1005), declares that any party to a pro-
reeding before the Con1n1ission nuty, as of right, 
become a party to 'any suit "Therein is involved 
the validity of such order.' The section does not 
in terms prov·ide that such party may instit~tte a 
snit to challenge the order. But this is implied. 
For, other,Yise, there "'"ould in some cases be no 
redress for the injury inflicted by an illegal order. 
Moreover, the fact of intervention, allo,ved as it 
"~as, implied a finding by the Commission that the 
plaintiffs have an interest. In the proceeding 
before the Commission, they opposed by evidence 
and argument the granting of the application. 
This they did as of right. For under the rules 
of practice, adopted by the Commission pursuant 
to Paragraph 1 of Section 17 of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, the intervener becomes a party 
to the proceeding, entitled, like any other party, 
to appear at the taking of testimony, to produce 
and cross-examine witnesses, and to be heard in 
person or by counsel. The intervention must be 
preceded by an order of the Commission granting 
leave; and leave can be granted only to one show-
ing interest. No case has been found in which 
either this court or any lower court, has denied 
to one who was a party to the proceedings before 
the Commission the right to challenge the order 
entered therein." (Page 675) 
The fundamental problem raised by the motion is, 
what is the relationship of Utah Pipe Line Company 
to the rights accorded to Utah Natural Gas Company~ 
If the Commission was without authority, as petitioner 
contends, to grant the certificate permitting Utah Nat-
ural Gas Company to hold the Salt Lake market while 
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others prospected for natural gas, and if petitioner has 
been deprived by the unlawful action of the Commission 
in itself obtaining a certificate, then petitioner has such 
a special interest as to permit review by this Court. 
It is manifest that gas cannot be supplied to the con-
sumers in this area by both Utah Natural Gas Con1pany 
and Utah Pipe Line Company. The requirements of the 
market and the large expenditures requisite for estab-
lishing a distribution system preclude the possibility 
of duplicate operations. This Court knows that the 
duplication of services by public utilities is not in the 
public interest and must be avoided. Since the right to 
perform the service is wholly dependent upon govern-
mental authorization, it is highly unlikely that a respon-
sible government agency will twice confer this right, 
benefit and privilege. The result of these circumstances 
is that the action of the Public S.ervice Commission has 
conferred the rights and benefits of this gas 1narket 
to Utah Natural Gas Company and effectively foreclosed 
the market to Utah Pipe Line Company without trial. 
Utah Pipe Line Company and Utah Natural Gas 
Company were competitors for this market and as such 
public convenience and necessity required that the Com-
mission give Utah Pipe Line ·company a full, fair and 
lawful hearing before granting any certificate. The right 
to serve the market confers a substantial economic bene-
fit. It establishes an exclusive property right of con-
siderable value. If the Commission's action is erroneous 
and unlawful as alleged in the petition for the writ, 
then Utah Pipe Line Company has suffered serious 
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damage to its econo1nic interest nnd is a verson sub-
stantially aggrieved by the Co1n1nission's netion. The 
memorandum of authorities sub1nitted in behalf of the 
Public Service Comn1ission asserts that Utah Pipe Line 
Company has no property interest to protect. The use 
of such a generalized staten1ent confuses a proper con-
sideration of the real elements of loss and injury. The 
writer of the article in Columbia La'v Review ('T ol. 49, 
page 793), in summarizing so1ne of the principal bases 
for revie,v, says : 
"The directness and magnitude of the injury 
or threatened injury is usually a factor. In the 
Chicago Junction Case, the Court 'vas impressed 
by the fact that even though the interest was a 
mere competitive one the amount involved was 
ten million dollars a year. * * * One of the sound-
est reasons for standing was stated by the Mas-
sachusetts court in holding that a producer of 
paper cartons could challenge an order fixing a 
higher price for milk in cartons than for milk in 
bottles: 'To say that he was not in truth "inter-
ested'' and "aggrieved", if the order is illegal, 
'vould be unrealistic and would place theory above 
fact.' " 
Utah Pipe Line Company has tremendous proven 
reserves of natural gas now available to supply the Salt 
Lake market and the financial ability to construct and 
the "know-how" to operate the required pipeline facilities 
to supply that market. Its application was filed with the 
Federal Power Commission and with the Public Service 
Commission to accomplish these purposes. These are 
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the economic endeavors and physical resources which 
make up Utah Pipe Line Company's property interest 
developed in anticipation that the larger property right 
in the form of a certificate of convenience and necessity 
would be open to acquisition. It is wholly unrealistic 
to contend under this situation that Utah Pipe Line 
Company is not "a party to the proceeding deeming 
hilnself aggrieved." 
RESPONDENTS' CASES 
In the memorandum of authorities filed by the 
respondents they avoid all reference to the Utah statute 
(76-6-16) which expressly authorizes a review by "a 
party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved" and ' 
base their argument on the old legal injury theory. 
The interests of an aggrieved party protected by a 
statutory right to judicial review are broader and the 
right of an aggrieved party to a review are more in 
keeping with justice than the narrow legalistic injury 
theory. Nor do respondents in their memorandum of 
authorities consider the effect of the Commission's deter-
mination that Utah Pipe Line Company had at the trial 
such a legal interest as entitled it to intervene. That 
determination in itself reflects on the question of right 
to review in a rather decisive fashion. 
The cases referred to in the memorandum of auth-
orities of the respondents are distinguishable and of 
little value to this Court. Respondents rely on: 
The Utah case of Gianulakus v. Sharp (Sup. ct. 
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of l~tah, 1928) 71 lTtah 528, 267 P. 1017, the Washington 
case of State v. Superior Court for J{iug Co~tnty, 131 P. 
2d 943, and the "\\~yoming case of Campbell v. Wyoming 
DeL·elopment Company, 100 P. 2d 124, were all original 
suits brought in trial courts. Further, the citation from 
American Jurisprudence, , .... ol. 39, page 859, comes fro1n 
the title ~'Parties", division "Plaintiffs" and deals with 
persons who are allowed to institute litigation in courts 
of general jurisdiction and does not deal with persons 
allowed to apply for review under "statutory certiorari" 
such as is now before this Court. 
The Gianulakus case, supra, was an original suit in 
equity wherein the plaintiff claimed the right to the use 
of "\Yaters from springs located on defendant's adjoining 
land. In a former case, the rights to the use of the water 
had been litigated and the plaintiff here (defendant 
there) had lost by a decree giving to the defendant here 
(plaintiff there) the right to the use of all the water from 
the springs and defendant there (plaintiff here) had 
been perpetually enjoined from taking water from the 
springs or from interfering with the other's use of the 
water. On a plea of res judicata the lower court dismis-
sed this case and on appeal this Court affirmed that dis-
~issal. The Campbell case, supra, was an original suit 
brought in a district court to quiet title to waters. The 
Court held that the plaintiffs had no title to the waters 
in question. 
The Superior Court case, supra, was a suit instituted 
by taxpayers of a school district in a court of general 
jurisdiction to· enjoin county school board members and 
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the county school superintendent from approving and 
carrying into effect a contract hiring Beardsly as school 
superintendent for one school in the county until the 
appeal of Thomas, the superintendent who had been 
dismissed and replaced by Beardsly, was finally deter-
mined. The taxpayer plaintiffs claimed that the board 
had not given sufficient reasons for firing Thomas as was 
required by a statute. The lower court dismissed the 
suit and the upper court affirmed the dismissal on the 
ground that the statute requiring "reasons" had never 
gone into effect and that, therefore, the dismissal of 
Thomas had not been illegal. 
The Aller&; Sharp, Pittsburg and West Virginia and 
Edward Hines Yell ow Pine Trustees cases were all cases 
brought in U. S. District Courts to enjoin andjor set 
aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
issued pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act. The 
section allowing such suits is 49 U.S.C.A. section 1 (20), 
which reads in part as follows: 
"Any construction, operation, or abandon-
ment contrary to the provisions of this paragraph 
... may be enjoined by any court of competent 
jurisdiction at the suit of the United States, the 
Commission, any commission or regulating body 
of the State or States affected, or any party in 
interest." 
The provisions of Section 76-6-16, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, allowing "any party to the proceeding deen1-
ing himself aggrieved" to apply for a writ of certiorari 
are more extensive and enlarge upon the right to a review 
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as con1pared "~ith a statute per1nitting suit by any party 
in interest. 
Colmsel for respondents place particular e1nphasis 
upon the .... \.Her and Sharp Inc. ease (Commerce Clearing 
House X o. 53-95, :Jiay 7, 1951-S F'ed. Carrier Cases). 
In that .case Craig Trucking Inc. had authority to oper-
ate as a common carrier in the transportation of certain 
conunodities between certain prescribed areas. Craig 
Trucking Inc. applied to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for an enlargement of its rights. Aller and 
Sharp Inc. were contract carriers by motor vehicle and 
challenged the granting by the I.C.C. of additional rights 
to Craig Trucking Inc. The Commission granted the 
application and the suit was to enjoin Craig Trucking 
Inc. The appellate court held that Aller and Sharp Inc. 
had no standing to challenge the grant of the operating 
rights to Craig Trucking Inc. in that "it does not have 
authority to transport machinery, equipment, materials 
and supplies used or in connection with the manufacture 
of paper, from the four above named destination points 
to Chillicothe." That is to say, the court held that 
because different commodities were to be transported 
there was no conflict. How different is that case from 
the case now before this c·ourt~ Utah Natural Gas 
Company and Utah Pipe Line Company propose to 
carry the same commodity along essentially the same 
route and supply the same market. If Utah Pipe Line 
Company proposed to carry natural gas in its line and 
Utah Natural Gas Company proposed to carry oil in its 
line, then the Aller and Sharp Inc. case might be in point. 
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It is believed that the proper test of the applic-
ability ~f case citation to the problem before this court 
is measured by its relation to the fact situation from 
which the citation develops and the relationship of that 
fact situation to the one under consideration by the court. 
A comparison of the fact situations existing in the 
cases cited by respondent Utah Natural Gas Company 
and the fact situation before the court by reason of Utah 
Pipe Line Company's petition. for a writ of certiorari 
reveals the following: 
Moffat Tunnel League et al. v. United States, 53 S. 
Ct. 543. Petitioners were unincorporated, voluntary 
associations formed by the local communities in and 
around Craig, Colorado. They were not competitors of 
the D. & R. G. W. R.R., the party favored by the Com-
mission's order. The petitioners were not engaged in the 
transportation business. They had no plans to under-
take railroad construction or operate any type of a 
transportation system. The court characterized their 
interest as no more than a sentiment. 
Utah Pipe Line Company is a competitor of Utah 
Natural Gas Company. Utah Pipe Line Company has 
extensive plans for construction of pipe line facilities for 
transportation of natural gas. Utah Pipe Line has large 
proven gas reserves to market. 
The Edward Hines Yellow Pine case ( 44 S. Ct. 461) 
referred to presents a fact situation that is entirely dis-
similar to the one now before the court. Petitioners were 
large wholesale lumber merchants. They were not com-
petitors *of the railroads who were directly affected by 
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the Con1n1ission's order discontinuing penalty eharges 
for failure to imn1ediately unload and return freight 
cars. Small lumber jobbers 'Yere benefited by this order 
because they 'Yere allo,ved to use the freight cars as 
\varehouses for a limited period of time. The railroads 
made no objection to the order and freely adopted it. 
Because the order helped to prevent the large lumber 
wholesaler from establishing a monopoly, they objected. 
The court, as in the Sprunt case, reasoned that in effect 
the injury emanated from the railroads and not the 
Commission. That the loss of comparative economic 
advantage in an already lucrative market was in reality 
no InJury. 
Petitioner before this court has much more than the 
loss of a comparative advantage to protect. It seeks 
to protect a right to an exclusive market. 
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. 8., 59 s .. Ct. 754. 
An order of the F.C.C. had classified petitioner as being 
controlled by a New York Telephone Company and 
hence subject to certain regulatory requirements of 
the Commission. Petitioner objected to the classifica-
tion. The lower court, with the full record of the Com-
mission's determination before it, dismissed on the merits 
the petitioner's request to set aside the order. On appeal 
to the U. S. Supreme Court the question of standing to 
seek review was brought up for consideration. The court 
held that petitioner did have standing to challenge the 
Commission's order and was properly before the court. 
The lower court's decision was upheld after the Supreme 
Court looked into the merits of such decision. In con-
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nection with the question of standing, the court discarded 
the negative order doctrine holding it to be an unrealistic 
technical device which confused rather than clarified the 
problem of who had standing to question a Commission 
order~ Therefore, the case illustrates a situation where 
the petitioner was held to be entitled to question or chal-
lange the Commission's order. Utah Natural Gas Coln-
pany has apparently erroneously cited the case for the 
opposite proposition. 
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas, 
64 S. Ct. 281. The quote from this case included by Utah 
Natural Gas in its memorandum relates to petitioner's 
objection to a finding by the Commission that past rates 
charged by petitioners were too high. The finding was 
made on the complaint of the City of Cleveland and in 
aid of state regulation. The finding in no way harmed 
petitioner (Hope Natural Gas) because it did not affect 
the present charges nor did it subject petitioner to any 
penalties, governmental or otherwise; nor did it create 
any consumer claims against petitioner. The real con-
troversy of the case was in relation to the c·ommission's 
order establishing the present rates. In connection with 
that order petitioner was accorded standing to challenge. 
The finding in relation to past rates was merely an unim-
portant incident of the case. 
L. Singer & Sons v. U. P. RR., 61 S. Ct. 254, was 
not a petition to review a commission order. It was 
rather a suit for an injunction to restrain· extension 
of railroad facilities without first obtaining a certificate 
of convenience and necessity. Petitioner was a whole-
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sale food broker located near the Kansas City, Missouri 
farmers' market. Kansas City, Kansas proposed to con-
struct facilities for a farmers' market in that city. The 
respondent railroad offered to buy some of the bonds 
issued by the city to finance the project and also the 
railroad offered to lay tracks into the market. Petitioner 
objected to the railroad providing the transportation 
facilities because such facilities might enable food 
brokers located in the Kansas City, Kansas area to 
compete with them. The court held that petitioner was 
not a party in interest because it in effect could show 
only the possibility that adverse competition might 
develop. In addition, petitioner had no right to question 
how the respondent railroad employed its facilities since 
this was not a proceeding before an administrative body. 
This fact situation is entirely foreign to the situation 
before this court. 
Alabama Power v. Ickes, et al., 58 S·. Ct. 300, 82 L. 
ed 37 4. Ickes was Federal Emergency Administrator 
of Public Works during the depression and Congress 
had appropriated money for the purpose of stimulating 
reemployment. Among other things public buildings 
were being sponsored and municipalities were obtaining 
grants for such construction. Alabama Power Company 
served electric power to certain municipalities. These 
municipalities entered into agreements with Ickes as 
such administrator under which the municipalities pro-
posed to build municipal power plants with federal funds. 
Alabama Power Company brought suit against Ickes 
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to enjoin the performance of the agreements. The court 
denied an injunction. 
Syl 2-"The interest of a taxpayer in the 
moneys of the Federal Treasury is not sufficient 
to enable him to maintain a suit to enjoin an 
alleged unlawful use of such moneys." 
Obviously the Alabama Power case is not in point 
here. 
Respondents would have the court believe that peti-
tioner is in the classification of a person having an inter-
est common to the public generally. Such is not the 
situation in the case before the court. The special inter-
est of Utah Pipe Line Company which it has asserted 
from the beginning of this controversy is peculiar to 
this petitioner and to no other person. It is that special 
interest which Utah Pipe Line Company seeks to pro-
tect in this proceeding. It is that interest which Utah 
Pipe Line Company sought to protect before the Public 
Service c·ommission of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
F·or the purpose of respondents' motions, the Court 
must assume that the facts set forth in the petition of 
Utah Pipe Line Company are true. The petition shows 
that before the amended application of Utah Natural 
Gas Company was heard by the Public S.ervice Commis-
sion of Utah, Utah Pipe Line Company had filed with 
the F!ederal Power Commission for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity wherein it sought permission 
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to construct and operate a natural gas pipe line essen-
tially along the same route as proposed by Utah Natural 
Gas Company but extending into a point near Aztec, 
New :Mexico; that Utah Pipe Line Company proposed 
to serve the sarne market as was to be served by Utah 
Natural Gas Company. In the petition of Utah Pipe 
Line Company for leave to intervene in the Utah Nat-
ural Gas Company case, Utah Pipe Line Company set 
forth: 
"9. That said projects of your petitioner and 
of applicant are in direct competition and that 
it is in the public interest that this Honorable 
Commission be given factual data upon which 
it may determine as to which of said projects 
would result in the best possible service in the 
public interest." 
The petition for writ of re·view also sets forth that on 
the 26th day of January, 1951, Utah Pipe Line Com-
pany filed its application No. 3578 with the Public 
Service Commission of Utah for authority to construct 
and operate the natural gas pipe line system set forth 
in its application then pending with the FedeTal Power 
Commission and that on January 27, 1951 and in accord-
ance with the rules and regulations of the Federal Power 
Commission and the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
Utah Pipe Line Company requested a "joint hearing" 
on its then pending applications. The petition for writ 
of review sets forth that notwithstanding these matters 
the Commission refused to permit Utah Pipe Line Com-
pany to offer any evidence as to the New Mexico reserves 
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and their availability to Utah and in effect limited Utah 
Pipe Line to an examination of the alleged reserves 
and financial condition of Utah Natural Gas Company. 
Utah Pipe Line Company in its petition for the writ 
specifically set forth (paragraph 11) the basis for this 
action. Among other things Utah Pipe Line Company 
alleged there was no competent substantial evidence to 
sutain the findings of the Commission; that the Commis-
sion improperly delegated its authority; that the Com-
mission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in limiting 
the participation of Utah Pipe Line Company in the 
proceeding; that the Commission acted in violation of 
the due process clause of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States in not permitting Utah 
Pipe Line Company to show the extent of its reserves 
in New Mexico and the pendency of its application before 
the Federal Power Commission; and that the Commis-
sion acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not processing 
the application of Utah Pipe Line Company then pending 
before it and particularly in not having a joint hearing 
thereon with the Federal Power Commission. 
Legal standing to sue is the narrow issue now before 
this Court. The record of the Commission is not before 
the Court and without such record the Court cannot 
properly consider the issues raised by the petition for 
review. For the purpose of respondents' motions the 
allegations of the petition for the writ of certiorari must 
be assumed as true. The statement in respondents' 
memorandum of authorities that interminable delay 
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would result if the Commission "\Vas required to process 
a series of applications before it could decide one appli-
cation is beside the point. The application of Utah Pipe 
Line Company 'vas the only application before the Com-
mission at the tin1e the Utah Natural Gas matter was 
being tried. Nothing prevented the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah from ordering an immediate hearing 
upon the application of Utah Pipe Line Company. The 
Commission arbitrarily elected to not process that appli-
cation and now maintains that position. If the Commis-
sion had regularly pursued its authority it would have 
granted a full hearing to this intervener in the Utah 
Natural Gas Company case so that it could be determined 
in the public interest what other sources of gas supply 
might be available to the Salt Lake market. The narrow 
issues on which the Public Service Commission of Utah 
required the case to be tried violated the rights of this 
petitioner and authorizes this review. 
Respondents' statement that Utah Pipe Line Com-
pany "is in much the same position as a low bidder on a 
public contract who seeks judicial review of the award 
of the contract to another bidder," should be paraphrased 
by saying that Utah Pipe Line Company is in much the 
same position as a low bidder who has submitted a sealed 
bid as the specifications required, and whose sealed bid 
is kept in the file and ignored by the administrative 
agency at the opening of bids and the awarding of the 
contract. 
On the basis of the foregoing it is submitted that 
petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, has, in its petition 
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for writ of certiorari, established its right to the writ 
as granted by this Court and has, if same be necessary, 
shown that it has whatever interest is required in the 
subject matter of this review. The motions to dismiss 
should, therefore, be overruled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. W. WILKINS 
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
920 Continental National Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
TURNER, ATWOOD, WHITE, McLANE 
AND FRANCIS 
Suite 1711 
Mercantile Bank Building 
Dallas 1, Texas 
(s) C. W. WILKINS 
Of Counsel 
Attorneys for Utah Pipe Line Company, 
Petitioner 
Received copy this 2nd day of June, 1951. 
(s) CALVIN L. RAMPTON, 
Attorney for Public Service Commission 
of Utah, et al., Respondents 
( s) CLIFFORD L. AsHTON 
( s) s .. M. CoRNWALL 
Attorneys for Utah Natural Gas Company, 
Respondent 
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